Each army inflicts 1 million casualties on the other. Within its scope, that answer appears to be substantially correct (due to the Soviets' numerical advantage), without being inconsistent with my (revised) answer.Įxample: The Soviets start with 10 million men against 5 million for the Germans. (Only the effect of being on the defensive allowed the Germans to inflict losses as slightly greater than a 1-1 rate.)Įditorial note: I inserted the bold-faced text in the above paragraph in response to another answer below regarding historian Trevor Nevitt Depuy's study on the relative combat effectiveness of the Soviet and German armies.
By 1943, the Soviet forces had caught up, in some cases overtaken the Germans in quality of equipment, and doctrine, to a sufficient degree to be able to win with a 2- to -1 numerical advantage, like Grant and the North against Robert E. In 1942, the Germans had lost the first two advantages, but their superior doctrine made the difference. In 1941, the Germans had the advantages of surprise, preparedness, superior tactical doctrine. After that, the Soviet loss rate, approaching 1 to 1, was less than their preponderance of manpower, which is why they ultimately won. In 1942, the casualty rates of about 2 to 1 represented a rough equilibrium, of Soviet vs. If they had continued at that pace, they would have won the war.
The Germans got off to a strong start in the first six months with relatively few casualties. This includes not only German losses, but those of allies (principally Hungarians, Romanians, and Italians.) So Soviet to German totals would be higher. As I understand it, the ratio of Soviet to Axis losses was something like 6 or 7 to 1 in 1941, perhaps 2 to 1 in 1942, and (close to) 1 to 1 in the latter part of the war.
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